This paragraph can be found on page 170 of the Selby-Bigge Nidditch editions. Hence, we also find Hume’s definitions at EHU 7.29; SBN 76-77, or Part Seven of the Enquiry, paragraph twenty-nine, pages 76 and 77 of the Selby-Bigge Nidditch editions. Nidditch. Hence, citations will often be given with an SBN page number (now called ISBN). Now imagine another line running through both wings of the plane. Let us now consider the impact that adopting these naturally formed beliefs would have on Hume’s causal theory. Generally, the appeal is to Hume’s texts suggesting he embraces some sort of non-rational mechanism by which such beliefs are formed and/or justified, what is billiards such as his purported solution to the Problem of Induction. The realist seems to require some Humean device that would imply that this position is epistemically tenable, that our notion of causation can reasonably go beyond the content identified by the arguments leading to the two definitions of causation and provide a robust notion that can defeat the Problem of Induction.

Hume’s two definitions of cause are found at T 1.3.14.31; SBN 170, that is, in the Treatise, Book One, Part Three, Section Fourteen, paragraph thirty-one. Hume’s shorter works, such as the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, are not as thoroughly outlined. When referencing Hume’s works, however, there are standard editions of the Treatise and his Enquiries originally edited by L.A. Clatterbaugh takes an even stronger position than Blackburn, positing that for Hume to talk of efficacious secret powers would be literally to talk nonsense, and would force us to disregard Hume’s own epistemic framework, (Clatterbaugh 1999: 204) while Ott similarly argues that the inability to give content to causal terms means Hume cannot meaningfully affirm or deny causation. Briefly, against the distinction, Kenneth Winkler offers an alternative suggestion that Hume’s talk of secret connections is actually a reference to further regularities that are simply beyond current human observation (such as the microscopic or subatomic), while ultimately interpreting Hume as an agnostic about robust causation.

One player must pocket balls of the group number 1 through 7 (which are the solid colors), while the other player has 9 through 15 (striped balled) and the first to pocket all the balls of their group first and finish by legally pocketing the 8 ball, wins the game! For the serious scholar, these are a must have, as they contain copious helpful notes about Hume’s changes in editions, and so forth. Winkler 1991: 552-556) John Wright argues that this is to ignore Hume’s reasons for his professed ignorance in the hidden, that is, our inability to make causal inferences a priori. Wright 1983: 92) Alternatively, Blackburn, a self-proclaimed "quasi-realist", argues that the terminology of the distinction is too infrequent to bear the philosophical weight that the realist reading would require. In the realist framework outlined above, doxastic naturalism is a necessary component for a consistent realist picture. After engaging the non-rational belief mechanism responsible for our belief in body, he goes on to argue, "Belief in causal action is, Hume argues, equally natural and indispensable; and he freely recognizes the existence of ‘secret’ causes, acting independently of experience." (Kemp Smith 2005: 88) He connects these causal beliefs to the unknown causes that Hume tells us are "original qualities in human nature." (T 1.1.4.6; SBN 13) Kemp Smith therefore holds that Humean doxastic naturalism is sufficient for Humean causal realism.

To return to the Fifth Replies, Descartes holds that we can believe in the existence and coherence of an infinite being with such vague ideas, implying that a clear and distinct idea is not necessary for belief. In this way, the distinction may blunt the passages where Hume seems pessimistic about the content of our idea of causation. But Hume also numerated his own works to varying degrees. However, Oxford University Press produced the definitive Clarendon Edition of most of his works. Hume wrote all of his philosophical works in English, so there is no concern about the accuracy of English translation. In other words, given the skeptical challenges Hume levels throughout his writings, why think that such a seemingly ardent skeptic would not merely admit the possibility of believing in a supposition, instead of insisting that this is, in fact, the nature of reality? Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Clarendon Press, Oxford, U.K., 2007, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. If it were written in the book of fate that one of her children should be exempted from the series of misfortunes which seemed to fall, one after another, almost as a matter of course, upon her husband, upon her, and upon her family; if so great good fortune were in store for her Grace as such a marriage as this which seemed to be so nearly offered to her, it might probably be well that Grace should be as little at home as possible.